<ct>*THIS IS ENLIGHTENMENT*</ct>

<csubt>AN INVITATION IN THE FORM OF AN ARGUMENT</csubt>

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<a>"What is Enlightenment?"

<headnote>*Sometimes, Francis Bacon observed, "a question remains a mere question" for "centuries."[1] "Mediating Enlightenment: Past and Present," an international conference organized by Clifford Siskin at New York University, with William Warner in California and Knut Ove Eliassen in Norway, sought answers to many questions about Enlightenment. We now invite you to find them—in abundance—in the individual essays in this volume. However, to our surprise, the conference as a whole also yielded a collective answer to the big question—the centuries-old question quoted above. We suspect that many of you assume that there cannot be a single answer to such a query, except, perhaps, the self-reflexive one: Enlightenment is what asks itself what it is. And we recognize that others have argued that there are many Enlightenments or none at all. But, in the spirit of Enlightenment conversation, we offer the collected efforts of our colleagues, as well as our own framing introduction, as evidence for a very different answer:*

> <ext in headnote>Enlightenment is an event in the history of mediation.</ext in headnote>

We will begin by recovering that history, for our place in it is the reason that the time for this answer has, we think, finally come.</headnote>

<A>Part One: This Is Enlightenment

The first step to a timely answer is to establish the timeliness of the question—and that does appear, at first glance, to be a very straightforward matter. "What is Enlightenment?" first came to the fore as the eighteenth century drew to a close. In 1783, that query echoed in the meeting halls of secret societies and in the periodical press in Germany.[2] Posed in a footnote to an essay published in December in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, it elicited responses the next year from Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant. With that exchange a conversation started that has now dominated inquiries into Enlightenment for over two hundred years. Their characteristic feature is a two-step

movement back to Kant's moment and then forward into discussions of Enlightenment's purchase on the present. But is the moment a question was first posed still the best place to look for an answer? This is a particularly pressing issue in regard to Enlightenment, since the decade of the1780s is a black hole for our standard periodizations of European history—the moment that elicited Kant's claim that it was an "*age of enlightenment*"[3] *and* our subsequent consensus that this same moment marked the end of the historical Enlightenment and the onset of another (Romantic) age.

Our first step, then, is to step back. We turn to the more distant past to gain some perspective on Kant's claims. Four hundred years ago, in 1605, Francis Bacon performed for an earlier age what Kant did for his: he polemically addressed the current state of knowledge. Bacon's call for a "Great Renewal" put knowledge under pressure—the pressure to "advance." When Kant gave his own report less than two centuries later, however, he changed the subject, putting "man" under pressure to do the same thing: it was time now, Kant announced in 1784, for men to advance from "self-incurred tutelage" into "general enlightenment." The label "enlightenment" has stuck with us in part because Kant gave "us" such a central role in it. From its opening paragraph, Kant's "Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" is user-friendly, offering a "motto" rather than a formal definition. Instead of a mystery to be dispelled—"What is it?"— Enlightenment became a practice to be followed: "Do this!" The motto tells us how— subliming Baconian pressure on knowledge into a direct challenge to the self adapted from Horace: "*Sapere aude!*" (Dare to know!).

Since self-help manuals target the future and not the past—they point us forward rather than back—it is not surprising that generations of readers have ignored Kant's differences with Bacon. The focus in "What is Enlightenment" on what to do next, from the politics of living under Frederick II to the imperative to develop, has from the start kept its audience facing in the same direction. Whether with regret or admiration, readers to the present day have seen Kant's motto as a signpost to modernity, turning Enlightenment into a precursor to be blamed or celebrated.

Foucault, for example, turned to Kant's essay again and again as a touchstone for defining his own project. Although he stressed the historical specificity of Kant's response—"The Prussian newspaper was basically asking, 'What just happened to us?'"

(Foucault 2007, 121)—Foucault, too, did not hesitate to treat Kant's "us" and his arguments as preludes to the present. Our modern habit of self-reflexivity, he declared, dates from Kant's strategy of "deporting the question of the *Aufklärung* into critique": the "critical project whose intent was to allow knowledge to acquire an adequate idea of itself" (67).[4]

In what we might call, then, a long revolution of knowledge under pressure—of efforts to renew and advance from Bacon to Foucault—Kant's 1784 user manual for Enlightenment falls, precisely, in the middle. But can it tell us about the past as well as the present—about Enlightenment not as anticipating us but as the historical event that precipitated the very question Kant was supposed to answer? The motto itself was, in fact, a turn to the past, not just to Horace, but to Germany earlier in the century. "Sapere aude!" had been foregrounded in German philosophical discussion since the Society for the Friends of Truth adopted it as their motto in 1736 (Kant 2007, 37). What is most telling about Kant's use of the phrase, then, is not that he chose it but how he translated it into German: "Habe Muth dich deines *eigenen* Verstandes zu bedienen!" (Have courage to use your own reason!). The translation is an elaboration that raises issues that are not a necessary part of the original. Kant recasts "Daring to know" as a problem of having the courage to use one's own understanding. When first printed, "eigenen" (own) was in bold, an emphasis that anticipated the essay's later turn to the *political* matter of obeying Frederick. That is one reason that Horace's "dare" became, in Kant, a matter of individual courage.

But was politics—"managing freedom" (Kant 2007, 37)—the only danger raised by man's *Verstand*, his "understanding"? Or was there a more fundamental concern? Did the very act of using it pose a risk—not necessarily to the user but to the desired result— to "knowing?" Here is where a turn to the past, rather than to our present, can illuminate what was at stake in Kant's formulation. The opening words of Bacon's *Great Instauration* provide the startling counterpoint: he writes because he "believ[es] that the human understanding creates difficulties for itself" (Bacon 1994, 3). This is the premise of Bacon's entire project: you should *not* depend on your own understanding. Such dependence is not a courageous act but an irresponsible one, a willful decision to ignore the track record of "stak[ing] everything on the mind's endless and aimless activity"

(Bacon 2000, 27). It is for this reason, Bacon argues, that we need "a complete *Instauration* of the arts and sciences and all the learning of mankind" (Bacon 1994, 3–4). In the enterprise of knowing nature, sticking to your "own" is the problem, not the solution: "[F]rom the very start, the mind should not be left to itself, but be constantly controlled; and the business done (if I may put it this way) by machines" (Bacon 2000, 28).

What changed between Bacon and Kant is nowhere more evident than in the ways they used the word "machine." To push his readers into taking the dare, Kant ends *What Is Enlightenment?* with a before and after of what they will become: if they use their own reason, "men" will be "more than machines" (Kant 2007, 37). This binary—man versus machine—became, of course, a staple of modernity and thus another barrier to our thinking of Enlightenment in terms that precede Kant's courageous selves. In Bacon, those terms are radically different: machines are not what we don't want to *be*; they are the means for men to *do* what they should be doing—making "advances worth of mankind" (Bacon 1994, 8).

"Machine" is one word in a cluster of terms that reappears again and again in Bacon: "aids," "assistance," "means," "instruments," and "tools"—the last two words being the most common translations of the term enshrined in the title of the second part of the *Great Instauration: The New Organon.* Bacon describes that part as the "digested" version of what renewal requires, since it consists largely of aphorisms, but, for our present purposes, it can be digested even further: "Men need tools."

Without tools, Bacon argued, "we would have the situation we have had for many centuries, that the sciences are almost stopped in their tracks, and show no developments worthy of the human race" (Bacon 2000, 7). Knowledge has stalled—and for an "utterly obvious" reason:

<ext>If men had tackled mechanical tasks with their bare hands and without the help and power of tools, as they have not hesitated to handle intellectual tasks with little but the bare force of their intellects, there would surely be very few things indeed which they could move and overcome, no matter how strenuous and united their efforts.</ext>

Whether moving a "heavy obelisk" or "advancing" knowledge, daring to depend on one's own strength or one's own understanding was not courageous, but an "act of utter lunacy" (Bacon 2000, 28–29).

Sanity, for Bacon, then, is accepting the necessity of tools—tools that work. The "Organon" must be "New" because the "errors which have grown powerful with age" resist correction by the "native force of the understanding," even when that force is reinforced by the "help and assistance of logic." In fact, Bacon asserts, the old Organon—the collective title traditionally given to Aristotle's works on logic—only "keeps and accumulates" "faulty" things. The syllogisms and dialectic of Scholasticism produce "a kind of giddiness, a perpetual agitation and going in a circle" (Bacon 2000, 2).

Bacon's new instruments, in contrast, are about control and "restraint" as a means of "open[ing] and construct[ing] a new and certain road for the mind from the actual perceptions of the senses." Some of those instruments were what we would now consider the equipment of the "actual"—of observation and demonstration—objects such as bottles, bladders, bells, scales (Bacon 2000, xiv–xvii). But the new instrument of "control" was not a physical thing but rules for the "road": a "method" to supplant Aristotelian logic. For Bacon, method was a "machine" for getting the mind's "business done" (Bacon 2000, 28).

His particular method, induction, has won Bacon a prominent place in the history of science. But we should not forget that it was only part of the solution to a larger problem: how to renew all knowledge. Induction itself was but one kind of method, and method was but one kind of tool, and tools were important because knowledge could never be direct: knowing required tooling. The problem of renewal—of why knowledge stalled and what to do about it—was thus fundamentally for Bacon a problem of "mediation." We use "mediation" here in its broadest sense[5] as shorthand for the work done by tools, by what we would now call "media" of every kind—everything that intervenes, enables, supplements, or is simply in between—emphasizing the Baconian stipulation that media of some kind are always at work.

Yes, Bacon is famous for pairing knowledge and power, not knowledge and mediation. And, yes, the link to power does explain why knowledge is useful—"ignorance of cause frustrates effect" (Bacon 2000, 33)—and induction does tell us how

to get our hands on it. But the "renewal" was not a static problem in logic and method; it was a problem in history, and by casting knowledge as necessarily mediated, Bacon found a way to identify and articulate change: mediation was always necessary but the forms of mediation differ over time. There is a history of mediation.

The differences illuminated in that history allowed Bacon to plot a new relationship to the past. Rather than rehearsing yet again the already tortured classical distinction between *episteme* and *technê*, the imperative of mediation mixed knowledge and tools, theory and practice. And since retooling produced historically different ways of knowing, Bacon could choose the "happy" option of "carry[ing] out our design without touching or diminishing the honour and reverence due to the ancients." New tools, he argued, opened for him a "way to the intellect" that the ancients simply did not have. Ancient versus modern was thus not a "contest" but history—a history that told of Bacon's good fortune in living in a moment of different "resources" than they did (Bacon 2000, 29).

The renewal, then, was historically specific. Since knowledge always required mediation and the forms of mediation were mutable, every historical moment was potentially a moment of change. But Bacon's project insisted on a hierarchy of change: there were moments of renewal, and there was an opportunity for a "Great Renewal"— the magnitude generated by the temporal conjunction of more new resources and more frustration with the old ones. In his time, Bacon observed, the "mechanical arts grow and improve every day" while the "received kinds of learning" are "barren of results, full of questions; slow and feeble in improvement" (Bacon 2000, 7–8).

What made this particular conjunction special—high up, that is, in the hierarchy of change—were what Bacon called three "mechanical things" with recent origins. Together, Bacon argued, they "have changed the face and condition of things all over the globe": "the art of printing, gunpowder and the nautical compass." More than "soil, climate or bodily qualities," these things, Bacon believed, made the difference he perceived between "civilized" Europe and "barbarous" New India. In his history, the most powerful "empire" had less purchase on the present than this trio of mechanical mediations; they set the stage for the new intellectual mediations of the Instauration (Bacon 2000, 100).

Bacon used the word "mediation" repeatedly throughout his oeuvre, usually in reference to divine and human intercession. In their invaluable prehistory of the term "media" in this volume, Knut Ove Eliassen and Yngve Jacobsen point as well to his frequent use of "medium" as a term for a generating or connecting substance or milieu (e.g., water is a "medium" for sound). Their essay tracks the changes in this cluster of words between past and present—between Bacon's moment of "renewal" and our current experience of change. Faced with a similarly disruptive mix of new tools and new frustrations with old ones, we have been expanding the cluster. Certain tools have become known as "media," "mass media," and "the media," and we now have a term, "remediation," that describes what they do to each other.

With a venerable past and expanding purchase on the present, "mediation" can bring a new history to bear on our efforts to understand Enlightenment. More are needed, for every kind of history foregrounds certain things and obscures others. The history of science, for example, has spotlighted "induction," and "power" has itself been empowered within the progress narratives of the nation-state. In similar fashion, Kant's siren call of the "self" continues to be amplified by the "historical" and "critical" "ontolog[ies]" described by Foucault. We have used "mediation" here to steer us past that call to Bacon's call for renewal, opening up a new perspective on what happened in between. Enlightenment, we argue, was an event in the history of mediation.

Pursuing this claim is not just a matter of locating Enlightenment against a static backdrop of mediation(s), for "mediation" is itself a moving target—from Bacon's centering of tools to our expanding semantic cluster. How did it become what Peter de Bolla calls in this volume a "load-bearing concept?" In John Guillory's formulation, this entailed a crucial "convergence" of "medium" and "communication." His essay blocks out with great care the movements of the supporting actors in this play of concepts: the intimacies of speech and persuasion yielding center stage to the distance technologies of writing and print.

Taking the "distance" of communication as the "indispensable condition" of our modern concept of mediation, Guillory offers it as an alternative to "the dominance of representation in Western thought." Unlike representation, mediation can "capture" the "hidden complexity of the process" it has for so long purported to describe—particularly

the issue of "'in what' form a representation is transmitted." This is where we should hear Bacon leading the way: on what besides our "own" selves should we rely? What do our tools do to what we do?[6] Unfortunately, as Guillory points out, these concerns have been lost yet again in the many versions of "media theory" that habitually "collapse the mediations performed by the media back into representations" in order "more easily to sustain the project of ideology critique."

To break that habit, cold turkey must start the moment we first repeat Kant's question, for asking What is Enlightenment? again, and yet again, turns Enlightenment into a problem of representation—into something that is guilty from the get-go of being hard to find and easy to judge. And the more times we pose the question, the more the mystery deepens: When did Enlightenment occur? Where did it occur? Did it really occur at all? On the slippery slope of Enlightenment studies, the turn to what Guillory calls "complexity" is more like simplicity itself: just juggle a few words and ask, "Occurred *in* what?"

Now that is a question with some answers. For Kant, Mendelssohn, and others in the 1780s, for example, Enlightenment was *in* the newspapers and magazines; it was, as Foucault slyly put it, "a current event," something "familiar and diffused which was in the process of happening and of going away" (Foucault 2007, 80, 121). But as the immediacy of the event faded, so too did knowledge of the forms of mediation that were central to it—the "in what" gave way to an interpretative focus on philosophical content. In that mirror, Kant's "motto" has taken on monumental proportions. We no longer see "Aufklärung" as the subject of a local debate about life under Frederick II—the essay containing the footnote to which Mendelssohn and Kant responded was about the presence of clergy at marriage ceremonies (Schmidt 2007, 2)—but, in Foucault's words, as both "a singular event inaugurating European modernity" and "the permanent process which manifests itself in the history of reason" (93). Neither of these historic, rather than historical, Enlightenments speak directly to what had happened and in what. If we want to know, that is, how Enlightenment "manifest[ed]" itself as an "event," we need to know what other forms and practices—in addition to writing in periodicals—were involved.

Foucault's re-posing of Kant's question begins with a reference to periodicals and ends with an injunction to put "reflection to the test of concrete practices," but

Enlightenment for him here and elsewhere remains primarily and crucially "a philosophical question" (97, 118–119, 93). To shift not only from the philosophical but to an actual answer to the question requires a history other than our Whig history of modernity, the history of Reason, or Foucault's governing rubric for his genealogies of practices, the "ontology of ourselves." We are indebted, of course, to those genealogies as themselves experiments—innovative efforts whose importance can be grasped anew within the rubric we are mounting here, the "history of mediation."

The practical advantages of this strategy can be clarified by comparing it to the two primary ways in which "Enlightenment" has been understood: as a period and as a thematic designation. The former too often begs the question of context: a period *of* what? If, for example, the period following Enlightenment is Romanticism—as it is in the developmental narratives of many nations—and Romanticism is most frequently understood as a literary/philosophical period, then is Enlightenment such a period, and in what nations? Thematic tagging, on the other hand, constructs context as a layering of "ideas," offering up Enlightenment as some kind of intellectual, or more broadly "cultural," movement. Among the many notorious problems with this approach[7] are the chronological problems generated by animating ideas with the requisite agency to change history on their own. Good historiographic intentions then fall victim to the Frankenstein syndrome: once you start them you can't stop them. They run amuck across national and other kind of boundaries, foraging in all directions across the history they were supposed to organize.

The Frankfurt school carried this hunter-gatherer style of intellectual history to its logical and absurd limit by starting with Bacon but then leaping all the way back to Homer's cunning Odysseus as the initial embodiment of the "instrumental reason" they used to identify Enlightenment—an idea that just as easily scurried forward in their horror movie to haunt modernity from Hitler to Hollywood to the present (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947). For those uncomfortable with such chronological excess, thematizing also stretches in the other direction. Instead of using one idea to extend a single Enlightenment across thousands of years, for example, it has also turned different ideas, within more conventional timeframes, into multiple Enlightenment*s*.

Our primary purpose here, however, is not critique. These strategies have produced valuable knowledge and will produce more. We are seeking instead to take advantage of what could *not* be done before now. In Bacon's terms, we enjoy the historical good "fortune" of writing at a moment of new and powerful mechanical and intellectual mediations. Thanks to networked computers and expanding semantic clusters—such as "medium" into "media" and "remediation"—we think it is time to take two steps in a different direction. First, we have specified what our history is a history "of." Second, we will try to locate Enlightenment as an "event" in it.[8]

To engage something as an event is to direct attention to the possibility of its singularity—of an Enlightenment that doesn't dissolve into too many years, too many things, or too many versions of itself. And that singularity, by emphasizing contingency of time and place, links an event to the elements of which it is not the product but rather the effect (Foucault 2007, 64). The relationship of "effect," that is, allows us to establish the multiplicity *and* specificity of that contingency without sacrificing both to the reductive linearity of causality.

"Event" can thus give us the traction we need to avoid slip-sliding through history; it helps us to think more clearly about practical matters such as dates. When, for example, does Enlightenment begin and end? Since that particular label was applied more or less *retroactively* in different locations, its ongoing usefulness lies in improving the ways that we have already applied it. Better dating thus lies not in inventing new dates for Enlightenment but in coming to newly useful terms with old ones. Here is where turning back past Kant to Bacon pays off: it gives us room to work on those established markers. What may at first appear to be a puzzling gap between Bacon in the early seventeenth century and Enlightenment in its conventional home in the eighteenth is for us an opportunity to see what a history of mediation can do.[9]

The first thing it tells us is that we shouldn't be surprised. Our own experience with computing suggests that it takes time for tools and technologies to take hold—to mediate, that is, in the particular ways that we come to expect. But they do so only after assuming forms and functions that were not obvious, or even possible, when first introduced. To the now familiar timeline of the computer's long metamorphosis from Charles Babbage's programmed gears of the 1830s to the ENIAC's missile-targeting

tubes of the 1940s to the iPhone, this volume adds Lisa Gitelman's often hilarious case study of how telegraphy morphed from a visual and writerly tool that used electricity to record messages on paper tape to an aural and speechlike medium for electronic communication.

  This Is Enlightenment as a whole frames a long history of mediation—one that reaches back to 1450, in the arresting images and analysis of Ann Blair and Peter Stallybrass, and forward to twentieth-century India, in Arvind Rajagopal's turn to the modern mediations we know as advertising. Within that history, at its chronological core between Bacon and Kant, print took center stage. Its proliferation, through new forms and networks of mediation, is also a story of apparent delay in which the fifteenth-century technology of inscription—printing through the use of moveable type—took hundreds of years to implicate and modify an already existing media ecology of voice, sound, image, and manuscript writing. Bacon, as we have seen, recognized print's growing power and tried to capitalize on it.[10] However, his critique of Scholasticism, like his positive program, arrived linked to and dependent upon developments in the history of mediation that took almost a century to resolve.[11]

  Print became central to that history not only because there was more of it, but also because it insinuated itself into other forms of mediation. To assert its prominence in these terms is thus not to downplay other forms of mediation, such as the visual. Instead, a history of mediation highlights the ways that the interrelated practices of writing, reading, and print informed those other forms—as when viewers began to "read" paintings and, increasingly, "write" about them.[12] And it helps us to avoid as well the debate that derails so many efforts to engage the power of print: since "mediation" embraces both the technological and the human—it does not discriminate, that is, against any particular form of agency—discussing print *in* its history points us past the increasingly unproductive binary of technodeterminism.

  Where we can go instead is into more detail about how mediations of *all* kinds interact over time. A history of those interactions offers two other strategic differences from related modes of inquiry. First, we emphasize "all," because "mediation" is the inclusive term for the history we propose; it can include what we now call "media," but as our examples below demonstrate, it is not restricted to them. The history of mediation

can thus engage "media history" and "media theory," but its wide range of objects, forms, technologies, agency, and interactions—and thus its chronological scope—differentiates it from both of those established enterprises.[13]

Second, since mediations can be more easily pinned down to specific times and places than "ideas,"[14] we can track more of them more accurately—and thus more readily identify patterns in those interactions. A history of mediation thus provides new—and newly useful—ways of thinking about change. We propose the following framework for locating Enlightenment in that history. For each of the three critical chronological markers we engage a particular kind of change:

<numbered list>1) To map the "*delay*" between Bacon and the conventional start of Enlightenment in the 1730s–1740s we project a historical hierarchy of mediations. It is historical in that it highlights certain forms of mediation as not inherently "better" but as enabling—in particular times and particular places—of others. In our elaboration below, we call those mediations *cardinal mediations.*

2) To identify Enlightenment as an "*event*"—one that conventionally occupies roughly a half century between the 1730s–1740s and the 1780s—we take a quantitative turn, focusing on the number as well as the kinds of mediation enabled by the early eighteenth century. Enlightenment emerged, we argue, as an effect of these *proliferating mediations.*

3) To understand how that event came to an *end*—and why it was at that same moment retroactively labeled by Kant's subject—we couple the concept of *saturation* to proliferation. Enlightenment, we argue, can be best understood not as failed, or interrupted by revolution or Romanticism, but as an event that was "successful" in two ways.[15] First, it performed as our label for it advertises: Enlightenment mediations produced change. Second, in detailing the effects of saturation on key mediations, we will show how Enlightenment contained the formal conditions for its own demise: in a strange way, it succeeded in ending itself.</numbered list>

Histories have their perks, and this one spares us more intellect-wasting custody battles over Enlightenment: "It's French, of course." "No, it's actually British." Grounded in specific mediations and yet yielding regularities, the history of mediation can clarify both

the singularity of each local event *and* what those events have in common. Here we must settle for a very preliminary sketch, but one that does do double duty—mixing enough detail from one place (Britain) to convey local contours with sufficient specifics from elsewhere to suggest the shared features of a larger-scale event.

CARDINAL MEDIATIONS

When we focus on the historically specific ways in which mediations can enable each other, the "gap" between Bacon and the onset of Enlightenment becomes a window that frames four interconnected changes. All involve mediations that were new, or newly important, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. *Taken together, these four overarchings mediations—changes in infrastructure, genres and formats, associational practices, and protocols—establish the conditions for the possibility of Enlightenment.*

A *new infrastructure* formed to enable the transmission and communication of information. In 1600, Cardinal Duke Albrecht VII, viceroy of the Netherlands, granted the official postal system of the Holy Roman Empire, Taxis, permission to charge postage for private letters. Over the course of the seventeenth century a public postal system for private letters developed in efficiency and scope. The Royal Mail service was first made available to the public by Charles I in 1635 and the General Post Office (GPO) was officially established by Charles II in 1660. The British Postal Bill of 1710 established uniform postal rates throughout the British Empire. Postal transport was facilitated by the development of fixed mail routes, as well as the formation of private trusts to fund and administer the turnpikes (Laguero 1995). In addition to new tools for mediating motion, the second half of the seventeenth century also saw new forms for gathering in one place. Most prominently, the social lives of the generations after Bacon were altered by a steady increase in the number and kinds of public houses (coffeehouses, taverns, inns) where individuals could meet, read, discuss, and otherwise act out new forms of sociability and publicity. The first coffeehouse in Britain, for example, was started in 1652, with the number rising dramatically until by 1700 it is estimated that London had from several hundred to over 1,000 coffeehouses (Cowan 2005, 154]).

In this same period, *new genres and formats* were developed that extended the reach of print and speech and enabled more of both. Regularly published public newspapers began with the *London Gazette* (first published in 1665 as the *Oxford*

Gazette). This was the first of a steadily increasing number of newspapers in Britain, Europe, and their colonies. The newspapers not only provided much of the content that circulated through the new infrastructure of the post and turnpike, they also became a new interface for mediating the users' knowledge of events, opinions, and even the speech of public figures. Right at the turn into the eighteenth century, a raft of additional periodic genres appear and flourish, including the wildly popular periodical essays of Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's *The Spectator* (1711–1713) and the proliferation of party political papers (e.g., Daniel Defoe's *Review of the State of the British Nation* (1704–1713) and John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon's *Cato's Letters* (1720–1723). We see these as cardinal mediations because they were enabling in a fundamental way. Increasing numbers of their readers became writers, their flow of contributions inducing the flow of capital, for this was the appropriation of surplus value in its purest form: almost all of this material was provided (and could be reprinted) for free. New periodicals could thus be launched and sustained with very little capital, making them a primary engine for the takeoff in overall publication levels in the latter part of the century. Writing in these forms mediated a fundamental change in readers—leading them to behave as writers—that, in turn, induced more writing and print (Siskin 1998, 155–171). Other kinds of writing and print played roles in inducing other flows, including the new genres of financial instruments discussed below.

New infrastructure and new genres and formats became crucial to the promotion of new *associational practices*. The Enlightenment emerged in part from the creation of a remarkable number and variety of voluntary associations, each promoting a distinctive discourse: political parties (like the Whig Kit Kat club), secret societies (like the Freemasons), scientific corresponding societies, gendered intellectual clubs, and group formations of many other kinds. Historians of science, for example, have argued that Bacon's prospectus for the reform of knowledge only begins to be realized after the founding (out of informal and secret societies) of the Royal Society in 1660 (charters come from the Crown in 1662 and 1663). The society rapidly became a node for relationships of correspondence with similar groups. The resulting network initially took shape as a European Republic of Letters, and then, in the second half of the eighteenth century, it spread throughout the newly forming empire (e.g., William Jones's Asiatic

Society). The scientific breakthroughs of Isaac Newton (the *Optics*, 1671 and the *Principia*, 1687) benefited from the resulting reorganization of the discourse of natural philosophy. Like the Royal Society, with its periodic meetings, its varied interest groups, and its printed journal, many of the clubs and voluntary associations enabled distinctive ways of harnessing to their purposes oral and aural communication, manuscript writing, and print.

Finally, *new protocols* emerged to underwrite the infrastructure, genres, formats, and associational practices we have described. Protocols are enabling constraints: the rules, codes, and habitual practices that help to secure the channels, spaces, and means of communication. Many transmission protocols could be named, but we will focus briefly on three that were particularly enabling: the postal principle, public credit, and the regime of copyright. The *postal principle*—by which "any one can address any one"[16]—gains currency with the increasingly efficient operation of the postal system. Its protocols—consistency of address, periodicity, dispatch, and privacy—assure that groups and individuals can communicate regularly and securely by manuscript, letter, and printed matter. *Public credit* is in a sense the postal principle for money—that is, value formatted for transmission. Its enabling constraints clear and secure paths for the flow of wealth through a society. That flow took its distinctively modern turn with institutional innovations in what became the banking system, as in the founding, in 1694, of the Bank of England. Serving as a vehicle for borrowing by the government, public credit had the important secondary effect of greatly expanding the financial instruments that underpinned the growth of global commercial markets (see the essays in this volume by Poovey and Baucom). In his description of the Royal Exchange published in 1711, Mr. Spectator, the fictional narrator often employed in Addison and Steele's periodical, offered a rousing appreciation of the wealth that a free global trade had brought to England (no. 69). The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries also saw the instituting of a new set of protocols enabling and constraining ownership and circulation of printed matter: the *regime of copyright.* John Locke's 1684 "Memorandum on Licensing" attacked both the legal printing monopoly extended by the government to the Stationer's Company as well as the official licensing of printed books, which continued even after the political settlement of 1688. Locke's critique, which blends an argument

for free trade with an argument for open access to knowledge, offered a conceptual groundwork for Parliament's decision to allow the expiration of the Licensing Act (in 1695) and, during the reign of Queen Anne, for the passage of the first modern copyright law. The limited-term copyright first formulated by the Statute of Anne (1710) balanced two opposing ideas: on the one hand, the author's ownership of his or her creation is supposed to provide incentives for the expansion of knowledge. But, on the other, a term limit for copyright assumes the general benefits to the public from the robust and unencumbered access to knowledge. For knowledge to be renewed on the scale envisioned by Bacon, it had to change hands; as the essay below by Adrian Johns demonstrates, hotly contested protocols regarding ownership, use, and punishment were negotiated as a way to enable this exchange./bulleted list>

PROLIFERATING MEDIATIONS

The "magazines" that first proliferated in Britain during the 1730s, such as the *Gentleman's Magazine* founded by Edward Cave in 1731, exemplify how cardinal mediations enabled mediations of other kinds. As "storehouses" of previously printed materials, they were literally filled with the output of the mediations described above, including the newspaper and the periodical and the new clubs and coffeehouses in which they circulated. They joined a plethora of new forms for mediating expanding outputs that appeared during the second quarter of the eighteenth century. These included efforts to manage the twin flows of print and knowledge by steering print into the newly idealized back formation of the "oral" (see Paula McDowell's essay in this volume) and squeezing knowledge into newly comprehensive forms of classification and condensation. The year 1728, for example, saw the publication of both John Henley's *Oratory Transactions* and Ephraim Chamber's *Cyclopedia.* Henley harnessed print to make his case for instituting a new range of forms and practices grounded in speech, from "conferences" and "disputations" to a "Week-Days Academy." "This Scheme will bring Home to any Person," he argued, "all the Benefit of Schools, Universities, Tutors, Academies and Professors, with more than can be reap'd from them." Chambers's similarly high and practical ambitions for his effort to mediate knowledge—encircling it in a single work—are evident in his subtitle, "An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences . . . the Whole Intended as a Course of Antient and Modern Learning."

By the end of the second quarter of the eighteenth century, another wave of proliferating mediations—in kind, in number, and in scale—swelled from the presses. Variations on the magazine replaced repackaging with more actively critical strategies such as the combination of summary and evaluation that became the trademark genre of the *Monthly Review* (1749) and the *Critical Review* (1755). At that same midcentury moment, Thomas Sheridan raised the stakes for Henley's "elocution" movement. As part of the inclusive undertaking Sheridan called *British Education* (1756), the "revival of the Art of Speaking" was now tipped to be a cure for "the Disorders of Great Britain." And imitators of Chambers were similarly emboldened, most famously in France, where efforts to translate the *Cyclopedia* into French in the 1740s led to the *Encyclopedié* project (1751–1772).

That project has remained the most visible single artifact of the historical phenomenon of proliferation we are describing. When numbers are invoked, the usual suspects are 71,818 articles, 3,129 illustrations, and Louis de Jacourt authoring an average of eight articles per day over six years. But in a history of mediation what counts as well as numbers is how they perform a proliferation of another kind: the expanding array of mediations geared to the goal of "Universal" encirclement: access to all knowledge for all people. These range from the practical (cross-referencing the alphabetic arrangement for ease of use) to the political (including the secrets of technique and craft so as to bring general human improvement through the sharing of knowledge). Diderot mocked those who would sequester the encyclopedia by giving it "the form of an enormous manuscript that would be carefully locked up in the king's library, inaccessible to all other eyes but his, an official document of the state, not meant to be consulted by the people" (Kramnick 1995, 18, 19). Authorship was similarly dispersed by the associational practice credited on the title page: "Par Une Société Des Gens De Lettres" (By a Society of Men of Letters).[17]

What the scope and gathering intensity of all of these proliferations demonstrate is that the cardinal mediations we have described had not only enabled many new forms of mediation; they had also added a new dimension to the very act of mediation itself. With new channels and stopping places for new genres and formats to circulate through new social matrices sustained by new protocols, possibilities and expectations for what

mediation could accomplish changed. The very medium of mediation—its architecture of forms and tools, people and practices—became load-bearing. On this new platform, each individual act came to be understood—and the result deployed—as working not only on its own terms but also as a part of a cumulative, collaborative, and ongoing enterprise.

That sense of enterprise was initially communicated through a cluster of terms that took on new meanings and force during the first half of the eighteenth century. In Britain, "improvement" and "progress" became rubrics within which vectors of comparison across more and more fields of endeavor changed direction. Comparisons that had pushed off from the past, as in "ancient versus modern," now invoked a future as something that could be accomplished: a better and more perfect whole made collectively out of more and more parts. Thus Chambers presented his *Cyclopedia* as "a Work so disproportionate to a single Person's Experience" that the reader must "suspect something of Disingenuity" in his claim to sole authorship. The work of the preface, then, was to recast his work in different terms—as a matter of what we have been calling "mediation." The job did not require an "Academy," Chambers argued, because "superior" access to earlier efforts to mediate knowledge, including "Dictionaries" and "Lexicons," had made him "Heir to a large Patrimony, gradually rais'd by the Industry, and Endeavours of a long Race of Ancestors" (Chambers 1728, 1).

The point of Chambers's encircling, however, was to make a better circle—not just to collect and repackage but to point knowledge forward, to enable proliferation. He thus "augmented"—that is, remediated—the earlier mediations in two ways. First, he updated by adding "Extracts and Accounts" of "a Multitude of Improvements . . . made in these last Years." Second, he sought to integrate "Patrimony" and "Improvement" through a "thing" that he claimed could not be found in previous works—"structure." "See[ing] nothing like a Whole"—his goal—"in what they have done," he drew a line between himself and his ancestors. Their "Materials," he declared, "needed further Preparation, ere they became fit for our Purpose; which was as different from theirs, as a System from a Cento." By his own description, then, "the chief Difficulty" of the *Cyclopedia* lay not in authorship and content but in "Preparation" and "Form"—in figuring out how to mediate the patchwork of the past.

It was those experiments in "Connexion," such as the "Course of References" between entries adopted by the French, that proliferated across what Chambers called the "Commonwealth of Learning." And as this traffic in new mediations increased, so, too, did a collective sense of difference from the past and of shared enterprise in the present. Since this was a matter, as Chambers emphasized, of being *formally* different from one's predecessors, ideas were not the primary issue—and histories of them can thus easily miss the point. To borrow Chambers's word, the issue was "structure" and the point was mediation—forms of mediation that he saw as "nothing like" those that came before. And the world in which those mediations proliferated—"so many Parts of some greater Whole"—also came to be experienced as different—as something that could *now* be known.

Right then, as if on cue, Francis Bacon appeared anew. A century after their first publication, his *Philosophical Works* were reissued in a new edition and translation, "Methodized, and made *English*" (Bacon 1733, title page). Although not forgotten— Bacon himself had remained a revered figure, especially within the Royal Society—the "renewal" had remained, in the words of the new editor, "unexecuted in most of its Articles." But by 1733, the "delay" was over. Within a few years of Chambers, Henley, and the *Gentlemen's Magazine*, Bacon's "PLANS" for knowing the world became a part of the proliferation we have been describing.

Like the other parts, this was not a reprinting but a mediation of the original texts. Dedicated to Horatio Walpole, as the *Novum Organon* was to King James, Peter Shaw's edition sought to reverse James's judgment of the *Organon* as "past all Mens Understanding." A more "intelligible" version of Bacon's "whole Plan," accessible to "the wiser and better Part of the Nation," would, Shaw hoped, secure support from Walpole, a person who had already executed "very important Designs for the Publick Good" (Bacon 1733, v). The strategy for improvement was to methodize the methodizer; it was now time to remediate Bacon's mediations.

Like Chambers, Shaw[18] identified as his first step the goal of a new "Whole": in this case, a whole that would rectify the failure of earlier translations to publish together the "Pieces" that "entirely depend upon" each other (Bacon and Shaw 1773, vi–vii). He then added, along the lines of Chambers's cross-references, new tools for forming that

whole, including an "Index" and a "Glossary" (viii). The purpose of this retooling was not to preserve Bacon's oeuvre as it had originally appeared but to allow the texts to become different—and thus participate in the kind of "renewal" that was now understood to be possible. The glossary, therefore, does not "give exact Definitions" but ones that "facilitate" (lxiv). And the translation is not "direct" but "a kind of open Version, which endeavours to express, in modern English, the Sense of the Author, clear, full, and strong" (vii).

Shaw opened up Bacon—augmented him—so that the mid-eighteenth century could, finally, make more out of him. And more at that moment, as we have been arguing, became different.[19] This new Bacon was new on paper—and thus would have qualified as a candidate for the very Society that long considered the old Bacon its father. In 1731, however, as Shaw was remediating Bacon, the Royal Society was remediating itself: new members now had to be proposed in writing and the written certificates signed by those who supported them.

New associational practices thus underwrote the sense that something different was happening. Although the cluster of words, formulations, and practices that we have been noting did not precipitate the term "Enlightenment" until later, our retrospective use of that term does not mean that we are imposing a coherence on the past that was not experienced then. That timing is, in fact, precisely what we should expect when an event emerges out of proliferating effects. France and Germany experienced the same clustering articulation of difference that we have identified in Britain, and at roughly the same time. The combination of "esprit philosophique" (philosophic mind), and "lumière" (light), for example, as Dan Edelstein has noted, were closely linked in texts by Fontenelle and Dubos in 1732–1733 (see Fontenelle 1732, 8; Dubos 1733, 487).[20] And Sapere aude," as noted earlier, surfaced as a motto for the Friends of Truth in Germany in 1736.

SATURATION

If we understand the roughly half century that follows this clustering sense of difference as a period in the history of ideas, then we are left with only one way to explain the paradox of labeling cited earlier: why did Kant turn that motto into a motto of Enlightenment-in-process at the very moment that we think the historical Enlightenment

ended? The answer must be that the ideas changed—changed in a way that made the process fail. Enlightenment must thus have been cut short or somehow interrupted by revolution or Romanticism—with, in some versions, its ghost returning to haunt modernity with nightmare versions of itself. These tales do have their insights and uses, but the history of mediation can direct our attention to other kinds of evidence and thus different explanations.

Having linked Enlightenment as an event in that history to proliferation, for example, we can track that event by looking for the consequences: when does proliferation turn into saturation? In Britain, we find that the proliferating print mediations of the second quarter of the century set the stage for the even more startling takeoff in overall print production in the 1780s (Siskin 2005, 818–820). At the level of the pervasiveness of the technology itself, the term "saturation" can point to the moment when the sense of difference generated by initial proliferation becomes more of the same. In that sense, saturation is signaled by the paradox of access. On the one hand, saturation means that more people have more access to the technology; on the other, it indicates that, strangely enough, direct access is not required—that even those lacking or refusing access are transformed by the ubiquitous presence of the technology.

This is the tale now being retold by the early twenty-first-century advent of electronic and digital media. Whether individuals have the technology or try to avoid it, everyone now has the sense that there is nowhere to hide from its mediating powers; in fact, the desire to hide is itself an index to saturation and confirmation of difference becoming a new norm. As Clifford Siskin argues in his solo contribution to this volume, certain genres and procedures identified with Enlightenment did not disappear but changed and mixed, performing new functions in newly normal roles.

Siskin's example is the genre of "system," which he describes as the vehicle for Adam Smith's effort to secure Scotland's place in the sense of shared enterprise we have described. As with Chambers and Shaw, Smith's strategy was improvement through mediation: by methodizing the English, he thought he could secure a future for the Scottish as British. But saturation here played a genre-specific role. What Siskin calls Smith's "master systems" always included specific sections for comprehending the competition within a larger whole. Thus, within a few decades of their start at

midcentury, the genre and the project became victims of their own success: more writing of more systems made reconciliation into a single system less and less likely—there was simply too much system for system to master. The genre had saturated itself.

The encyclopedic system making taking place in France during the same decades met a similar fate. The startling numbers of Diderot's project indicated both success and a limit. Even before the first version was completed, *Britannica* had appeared across the Channel (1768) proclaiming its rival's obsolescence Its editors saw saturation in the very image of the *Encyclopedié*'s ambition—its master diagram of knowledge—and in its "repugnant" organization. They abandoned the diagram and replaced alphabetization of technical terms with a new mediation: knowledge was "digested" into a different kind of system—"distinct treatises" devoted to what we can now see as the prototypes of the narrow-but-deep divisions of the modern organization of knowledge. By the completion of the second edition in the year of Kant's essay, 1784, *Britannica* included 150 of these treatises. When we understand Enlightenment as the mediation of knowledge—and not just the bits and pieces of knowledge we call ideas—then the evidence that it *happened* includes the new protocol for knowledge that it established: the enabling constraints of disciplinarity.

Tracking saturation thus shows Enlightenment to have been successful in its own terms; it was, in these concrete ways, an event that ended itself. Kant's role in that end, however, was not what it may have first appeared to be. In the history of mediation, he did not *change* Bacon's subject from "knowledge" to "man." Rather, Bacon's plan for renewing knowledge *produced* Kant's daring subject. After the many mediations we have detailed, man became a new kind of tool—a tool whose power now lay in its insistence on using its "own" understanding to change itself. And since change for this new, modern self was now always ongoing—we still define ourselves by our need and capacity to develop—Kant *had* to insist that we are not yet "*enlightened*," just living in an (ongoing) "*age of enlightenment.*" His claim was philosophical, not historical. The event in history that we call Enlightenment, however, was coming to an end—an end signaled by the kinds of saturation that characterize our own moment in the history of mediation. We hope that this introduction and the essays that follow will prove to be useful efforts to mediate that experience.

<a>Part Two: The Distinctness and Organization of This Collection

In the past twenty years a remarkable number of books have attempted to rethink Enlightenment.[21] Rather than trying to subordinate all of them to our own effort through summary and critique, we will instead clarify what we consider this collection's distinctive contribution to this vigorous conversation. Most important, this book should not be read as a study of Enlightenment *and* media/mediation. Many scholarly collections strategically pair "Enlightenment" with more specific topics for study, whether through the use of the conjunction "and" (as in *Women, Gender and the Enlightenment*, [Knott and Taylor 2005]), or by using a preposition that locates something "in" Enlightenment (*The Sciences in Enlightened Europe* [Clark, Golinski, and Shaffer 1999]), or by specifying a scholarly contact zone for the encounter of Enlightenment and the colonized other (*Postcolonial Enlightenment* [Carey and Festa 2009]). Each of these collections, all published within the past decade, present a relation between two terms that are separated before their complex and manifold interrelations are specified: Enlightenment and gender, Enlightenment and the sciences, Enlightenment and the postcolonial. In every case, recent developments in the disciplines have encouraged a new critical practice, so Enlightenment and its discursive "other" can codevelop and cast each other in a new light.

The scholars of gender who have contributed to *Women, Gender and the Enlightenment* come to their study with a theoretically inflected sense of the plasticity of gender. This enables them to develop new ways to examine "the gender dimension of Enlightenment thought and practice" (Knott and Taylor 2005, xvi). Because contemporary historians of science have accepted a "post-positivist" concept of science, one that sees science as embedded in culture and history rather than apart from them, the scholars who contribute to *The Sciences in Enlightened Europe* bring a new range of Enlightenment scientific practices into view, which acquire a new critical salience (Clark, Golinski, Shaffer 1999, ix). Finally, those postcolonial scholars who contribute to *Postcolonial Enlightenment* have fully assimilated a critique of the Enlightenment's expansive colonizing projects. However, by rejecting the Enlightenment as a "monolithic bogeyman," their studies give us access to Enlightenment's plurality, including its anticolonialism (Carey and Festa 2009, 10). In each of these studies there is a valuable

expansion of our understanding of Enlightenment as well as a historically inflected renewal of term paired with Enlightenment: "women," "science," and "postcolonialism."

Although we acknowledge the cogency of this contrapuntal strategy, this collection pursues a different approach. By apprehending Enlightenment as an event in the history of mediation, we are arguing that one cannot disentangle the phenomenon called Enlightenment from the history of mediation as it unfolds in the particular forms and genres, the associational practices, and the protocols first developed in the long eighteenth century. Therefore, our use of the copula—Enlightenment *is* an event in the history of mediation—radicalizes the intimacy of Enlightenment and mediation, so as to catch their mobius-strip-like coimplication. If Enlightenment and mediation are understood in this way, then mediation is the condition of possibility for Enlightenment—and Enlightenment mediations become the condition of possibility for the many other discursive, material, and intellectual transformations that often become the focus of Enlightenment studies, including, in the collections we have just discussed, those falling under the rubrics of gender, the sciences, and postcolonial politics. Thus, without a complex historical mutation *in* mediation—that is, without postal communication, the newspaper, the pamphlet, voluntary associations, and generic inventions (like the system or the popular declaration)—there could not be the sort of reorganization of knowledge that was sponsored by the Royal Society or the *Encyclopédie* project, or the sort of distributed communication and associational practices that lie behind the revolutions in America, France, and Haiti. Without a media sphere that is open, public, and (relatively) cheap, there could not have been the highly coherent and widely disseminated Anglophone "debate about the French Revolution" as it was developed by Dr. Richard Price, Edmund Burke, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Thomas Paine. This debate reacts to and builds upon the comprehensive style of address to "mankind" found in the popular declarations of 1776 and 1789, and all of this universalizing public discourse about the rights of man and women emerges out of and presupposes the mutations and proliferations of mediation that generate the event we call Enlightenment.[22]

Our account of Enlightenment mediation assumes a debt to Jürgen Habermas, and those many prominent scholars who have extended, critiqued, or revised him (Baker

1990;Goodman 1994;Warner 1990, 2002). Habermas was one of the first scholars to shift the study of the Enlightenment from intellectual history, whether elite or popular, to a much more capacious and heterogeneous set of terms as they operate together: places, like coffee shops and *salons;* voluntary associations of every kind; media, like letter writing and print; as well as the ideas they circulate (see also. Darnton 1970; Chartier 1991).

However, understanding Enlightenment as an event in the history of mediation differs in fundamental ways from the public sphere approach. First, studies of the public sphere invariably downplay the mechanics of mediation, the role of technologies, the influence of genres, the dynamic of association, and the aggregate effect of elemental protocols. By separating the human from the tool and the group from its informing structures, public sphere studies makes the business of mediating meaning something that rests with strictly human agency, appearing in the collective guise of "the public." The abstractness of the term "public" explains both the allure and the liability of Habermas's terminology. Scholars have used this terminology to demonstrate that numberless nations and epochs engaged in "making publics," "publicity," and addresses to the public. Habermas's analysis depends, as Keith Baker has pointed out, upon a blurring of the boundary between using the "public sphere" as a descriptive term, as denoting the communication practices that emerged in the eighteenth century, and a normative term, which offers a model for rational negotiation through communication that we moderns have fallen away from (through the modern "decay" of the public sphere) but to which we should return. By contrast, the studies of Enlightenment mediation collected in this volume are not constrained by this nostalgia. They comprehend a broader and more capacious set of phenomena than that opened by the study of the public sphere. By understanding those mediations as themselves constituting a history, this volume saves the enormous variety of Enlightenment mediations from being relegated to supporting roles in Habermas's political master plot: the liberal-Marxist story of the bourgeois critique of and resistance to political absolutism.

While the essays in this collection might have been gathered under many different rubrics, we have arranged these essays to foreground one aspect of Enlightenment considered as an event in the history of mediation: in part 1, the concept of mediation and

its operation within particular historical itineraries (natural history, the American Revolution, and the invention of the telegraph); in part 2, the diverse genres of Enlightenment (files, systems, the spiritualized inner dialogue of soul and self, and advertising); in part 3, the novel effects of the proliferation of the numbers and kinds of print (ballads, art criticism, novels, and piracy/copyright); and, in part 4, the emergent practices of Enlightenment (finance, policing/policy, preaching and aesthetic knowing). Here is a brief overview of the essays of the collection.

MEDIATION: A CONCEPT IN HISTORY

Part 1 of this collection, "Mediation: A Concept in History," suggests various ways in which mediation can be said to have a history. In "Enlightening Mediation," John Guillory offers a philological genealogy of related terms—persuasion, communication, medium, media, mediation—in order to excavate a struggle that works through the whole (hidden) history of mediation: the tension, on the one hand, between the supposed purpose of communication (whether it be the use of rhetoric to persuade or the later ideal of transparent representation that overcomes the opacity of language) and, on the other, the diverse means by which information has been transmitted between sender and receiver by a medium, the media, or (most generally) mediations. In our second essay, Knut Ove Eliassen and Yngve Jacobsen caution against the anachronism of applying the modern concept of "the media" to Enlightenment in their essay, "Where were the media before the media? Mediating the world at the time of Condillac and Linnaeus." For them the cleavage between Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment media arrives when new early nineteenth-century technologies—the telegraph, the photograph, Babbage's analytical engine—separate information processing from the eye, the hand, and the interiority of the individual, which during the Enlightenment still sustained the vital middle position in the transmission of information. For example, in order to fashion Carl Linnaeus's traveling body into a medium through which data about the natural history of Lapland can flow back to the Royal Society of Sweden, the young naturalist prepared for his journey by assembling his instruments: the notebook, the magnifying glass, the measuring rod, and so on. In their account of Enlightenment epistemology, Eliassen and Jacobsen show that these tools are presumed to function in the same way as the human senses that they extend.

Peter de Bolla, in "Mediation and the Division of Labor," traces the steps by which Adam Smith developed a new concept, the division of labor, out of a chain of terms that depended upon and followed from one another: the division of the manufacturing process, worker specialization, machines, productivity gains that are (mathematically) sublime, time as speed as a coefficient of the cost of labor that "saves time," among other things. De Bolla's analysis shows that what held this chain of terms together and gave Smith's interpretation of political economy its coherence was Smith's invention of a new load-bearing concept, the concept of "the division of labor." How, then, might the concept of "mediation" bear the weight sufficient to support a new concept of Enlightenment? Taken together, the first three essays of the collection suggest the analytical power of a general concept of "mediation," that is, one that can be applied across different historical periods.

In "Transmitting Liberty: The Boston Committee of Correspondence's Revolutionary Experiments in Enlightenment Mediation," William Warner argues that we can counteract the unreadable familiarity of one of the paradigmatic historical episodes of the Enlightenment—the American Revolution—by situating it within the history of mediation. By Warner's argument, the Boston Committee of Correspondence came to play its decisive role in the British imperial crisis through a series of consequential mediations: the institution by the Town of Boston of the committee as an interface for political mobilization; the rewriting of the ancient petition to authority as a popular declaration addressed to fellow citizens; and the interlinking of the towns of Massachusetts, and then the thirteen colonies, into a network that could declare independence from Britain and fight the war to uphold that declaration. It is these particular mediations that give form and historical force to the "ideas" that dominate most histories of both the American and French Revolutions: liberty, equality, the imperative to critique authority, and popular sovereignty, as well as what we assume to be a distinctly modern experimental and optimistic orientation toward the future.

Since the new American republic is born out of media innovation, it is especially well positioned to experiment with new forms of mediation (Starr 2004, 3–5). In "Modes and Codes: Morse and the Question of Electronic Writing," Lisa Gitelman's genealogy of Morse telegraphy zooms into the complex mediations necessary to produce one of the

most consequential events of the modern era: the invention of a new media technology. Instead of the flash of divine genius—encoded into telegraph history with the supposed first message, "What hath God wrought?"—Gitelman tells the story of a chain of mediations, from Morse's first schemes for telegraphic writing, the several patents he registers and then defends, to the final decision of the Supreme Court. Gitelman's account leaves us with a story that links successful implementation of the new medium with the notion of "delay" discussed in our argument above. In this case, the delay involves simplification and paring down. Thus, Morse's initial scheme, which is visual, writerly, print-heavy, and recording-capable, is transformed into a faster, aural, speechlike one, by the bodies of telegraph operators, who can take the written messages and translate them into clicks, which can then be heard and transcribed on the fly by the receiving operators. As with Warner's discussion of the aggregation and prosthesis made possible by political committees of correspondence, Lisa Gitelman's analysis of the Morse telegraph suggests a feedback loop by which human bodies mediate the new technologies they become mediated by.

ENLIGHTENMENT: EVIDENCE AND EVENTS

The essays in our second group offer evidence for understanding Enlightenment as an "event." In "Mediating Information, 1450–1800," Ann Blair and Peter Stallybrass argue that the Enlightenment involved not so much a radical break with, but an inheritance of, established technologies for storing, organizing, and retrieving information. Thus, for example, heroic narratives of the Enlightenment *Encylopédie* conveniently forget that it was in the first age of print (1450–1650) that the technologies of information were developed. These include ways to stockpile information (for example, by collecting notes taken on books, using blank forms, the development of shorthand); finding aids (alphabetic indexes, running heads, the use of a thread to file loose papers); and methods for collaborating to edit huge compellations of knowledge (hidden editorial assistants; "slips" to update indexes; and literal "cut and paste" of previous books into new books). But even if one accepts their idea of the strong continuity between the early modern (Renaissance) and the Enlightenment is correct, and if one agrees that the "info lust" that so characterizes the modern period was transmitted from the earlier to the later period, how are we to account for the distinct contributions of Enlightenment?

In "Mediated Enlightenment: The System of the World," Clifford Siskin argues that we should look to the late seventeenth-century upsurge in the number and ambition of the new genre of the system: "System was the formal means to Enlightenment's end: comprehensive knowledge of a world that *could* be known—of parts that formed a whole." Newton demonstrated the "system of the world" that *is* nature through the use of induction, simplicity, and mathematical proof. Adam Smith then capitalized on Newton's success by launching the project we now call the Scottish Enlightenment as a remediation: the systematizing of "English philosophy," including Newton. But Siskin shows that as systems proliferate and efforts to produce "master systems" that incorporate all systems founder, the genre is increasingly embedded into other forms. The result was a turn toward more specialized and localized knowledges and practices in writers such as William Wordsworth and Walter Scott. These new practices issue in the narrow but deep knowledge strategies of the modern disciplines. In "Romanticism, Enlightenment and Mediation: the case of the inner stranger," Robert Miles zeros in on the knowledge strategies of the self. Miles shows that the popular poet Edward Young and the author and critic Anna Letitia Barbauld use the figure of the "inner stranger" to reconcile a transcendental soul with a mundane self. Through a reading of the way Samuel Taylor Coleridge takes up the same figure (in "Frost at Midnight"), Miles traces a secularizing movement from a "porous" to a "buffered" self (cf. Charles Taylor), so the enigmatic equivocations of this "inner stranger" mediates the appearance of a distinctively modern concept of the unconscious it (or Id) within the self.

In "The Present of Enlightenment: Temporality and Mediation in Kant, Foucault, and Jean Paul," Helge Jordheim analyzes how these three writers negotiate what he sees as a central contradiction of Enlightenment. On the one hand, each insists, within their distinct discursive itinerary, that the value and promise of Enlightenment consists in the way it allows us to think the present, the distinctness of the present age, and build a "now" that requires a certain ethos: "a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task" (Foucault). Without this sense of a present, Jordheim asks, how could a task like political revolution be attempted? On the other hand, Jordheim's analysis demonstrates that each of these

writers, in their different ways, runs up against the inevitability that the "present" of Enlightenment not only entails temporal deferrals and spatial differences; crucially, Enlightenment can only materialize within the various mediations of speech, writing, print, and image.

The heteronomy of Enlightenment mediations becomes more still acute when a state seeks to transmit aspects of Enlightenment modernity to non-European nations and peoples. In "Enlightenment in India," Arvind Rajagopal interrogates the contradictions that befell the Congress Party in the wake of Indian independence in 1947. What happens when concepts and practices associated with Enlightenment—suffrage, freedoms of various kinds, political economy—are not homegrown but imports? When they do not develop gradually but are instituted in one year? Are not expressions of popular sovereignty but the explicitly pursued policy of a state seeking to discipline a people into modernity? Rajagopal describes the special privilege the Nehru government gives to modern communications, and most especially television and advertising, as channels through which to reach the nonliterate members of the nation and reorganize the sensorium of India. Rajagopal's reading of one television ad for the *Times of India,* entitled "A Day in the Life of India," demonstrates the complex mediations entailed in the co-mingling of the promises of Enlightenment, advanced capitalism, and alluring visual displays of wealth, with the knowing skepticism of an indigenous oral Hindu culture.

PROLIFERATION: MEDIATION AND PRINT

The essays in this section offer new ways of engaging a phenomenon that was widely remarked upon during the eighteenth century: the proliferation in the quantity and kinds of print media. The proliferation of print helped create new disciplines of knowledge and new understandings of print's relation to its others. In "Mediating Media Past and Present: Toward a Genealogy of 'Print Culture' and Oral Tradition," Paula McDowell develops a striking historical analogy around the perception of what she calls "media shift." Just as twentieth-century studies of oral (as opposed to scribal and print) culture took off in the wake of new twentieth-century oral technologies like telephony, the phonograph, and the radio, so too did the eighteenth-century conceptualization of oral tradition emerge in a complex dialectical relationship with an emerging sense of the

sometimes reviled and sometimes improving effects of the steady proliferation of print. While McDowell is finally skeptical of those eighteenth-century theorists who postulated an original oral tradition, one that is then supplanted by a print one, McDowell documents the eighteenth century's first draft of the comparative media analysis later conducted in the twentieth century. In "Mediating Antiquarians in Britain, 1760–1830: The Invention of the Oral Tradition," Maureen McLane offers a case history to support McDowell's media analysis. McLane's account of what antiquarians do to transmit ballads—gathering, citation, forensic editing, authentication, and quarrels over value— allows us to see the antiquarians as mediators and inventors of an oral tradition that can then be used retroactively to legitimize literary and national claims. Both McDowell and McLane enable us to identify the procedural, technical, and conceptual debts that the scholars in the present must assume from these pioneering Enlightenment mediators of oral and print culture.

Anne Fastrup puts the question of the positive or negative valuation of print media at the center of her discussion of the encyclopedists' project of Enlightenment. In "Mediating *le philosophe*—Diderot's Strategic Self-representations," Fastrup describes the diverse strategies pursued by Diderot to guard the exalted aims of the *Encyclopédie* project: an idealization of the figure of the truth-loving "philosophe," the excoriation of the journalist, and finally a recourse to art criticism, where the critical detachment of the critic can be secured against the competitive din of journalism. Fastrup's essay lays bare the contradiction that challenges Diderot at each turn: to transmit knowledge to the public they would uplift, the *philosophes* must rely upon the unruly print market that sustains journalistic critics—even though the attacks on the "Encyclopedists" are often ill-informed, mean-spirited, or patently self-interested.

In spite of its commercial entanglements, part of the potential prestige of print came from the belief that it could offer unprecedented access to the new systematic knowledge of eighteenth-century science. In "Novel Knowledge: Judgment, Experience, Experiment," John Bender argues that the British novelists of the early eighteenth century adopted three elements of natural philosophy in fashioning their narratives: surrogate witnessing, the contrived experiment, and the induction-based reasoning that could translate the findings of a single experiment into truths of general validity. In an essay

that resonates with Michael McKeon's contribution to this volume, Bender shows how early novelists fashioned printed texts into experiments that mediated different kinds of knowledge as a means of mediating the fictional and the real. The tools he describes both confer experience to the fictional characters and advance the judgment of both characters and readers.

The overall proliferation of print during the eighteenth century foregrounded the problem of who owns and controls the products of that technology. In "The Piratical Enlightenment," Adrian Johns shows how eighteenth-century German states, as net importers of intellectual property, found that piracy, the free reproduction of books first published by others, could support the Enlightenment ideal of free and open access to knowledge. However, in the story that Johns unfolds, the ensuing debate about the comparative value of a restricted copyright (the English system) and liberal reprinting (German piracy) not only implicates the mediation of Enlightenment (where piracy offers robust circulation of knowledge) but also bears upon what became the most important positive rational for seeing writing as an expression of the self: the idea that the writer is a genius, whose distinct form of thought emerges from a unique self. Ownership in the form of copyright became the primary way of instituting this connection between writing and genius.

EFFECTS: EMERGENT PRACTICES

The event in the history of mediation that was Enlightenment, as well as the proliferation of print media that helped to give distinct shape to that event, carried diverse effects. The five essays in this section offer ways to understand the economic, political, social, and religious practices that emerged from Enlightenment: financing, policing, preaching, and aesthetic criticism. In "Financing Enlightenment," Mary Poovey highlights a paradox concerning the relationship between money and memory, the practices of Enlightenment and power. Enlightenment economic projects require money, but the effective power of money (to hold and transmit value) depends upon transforming an earlier medium for transmitting value (like gold) into new genres of money (such as bills of exchange, letters of credit, Bank of England notes), but—and here is the paradox—the efficacy of these proliferating money genres depends upon an abstraction that effaces the memory of any relation to original forms of value. Poovey, echoing earlier critiques of Enlightenment

rationalization like the Frankfurt school, further suggests that her analysis of "how money lost its own history" suggests that "erasure is intrinsic to Enlightenment…as one of the conditions of its possibility" (p. ■■ below).

In the companion piece to Poovey's essay, "Financing Enlightenment, Part Two: Extraordinary Expenditure," Ian Baucom offers one example of the not so "enlightened" payoff from the abstraction and forgetting Poovey describes: money carries law, and law sanctions violence. Baucom's critique pivots on the 1653–1660 account ledgers of Jan Van Riebeeck, the founding commander of the Dutch East India Company's fort and provisioning settlement at the Cape of Good Hope. Alongside the routine expenditure for cows, food, and supplies, there is an "extraordinary expenditure" in the year 1659 to suppress a rebellion of "Caapmen and Hottentoos," who had suddenly attacked the Dutch trading post. Baucom shows that Van Riebeeck's legal rationale for this "just war" against an indigenous people depends upon the political theory of Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651), as well as Zouch's *Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law between Nations* (1651) and Hugo Grotius's *Rights of War and Peace* (1625). These texts conceptualize a law that extends outside the state and justifies violence not merely against pirates and brigands but other "inimici," those who are inimical by virtue of failing to possess a state, a senate, and a treasury, by failing to commit themselves to commerce and commonwealth, and are therefore incapable of entering into treaties with others. According to Baucom, this nexus of law/money/violence, in which each mediates the others, wins formal philosophical sanction as a global imperative or universal rule during the Enlightenment, through Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* and his concept of cosmopolitan universalism and "perpetual peace." Baucom further argues that this same conceptual machinery has been revived by the post 9/11 U.S. national security agencies on behalf of "an unabashedly conjoined theory and practice of international law, global war, and speculative capital" (below, p. ■■).

In "'The Horrifying Ties, from which the Public Order Originates': The Police in Schiller and Mercier," Bernhard Siegert offers a very different way to raise the question of Enlightenment mediations of power. Siegert begins by contesting the "two-hundred-year-old myth" that understands the Enlightenment as the epoch when media mediates the private citizen's self-realization as the Public, enabling, in Habermas's influential

account, bourgeois society's successful confrontation with the absolutist state. As an alternative to this familiar narrative, Siegert describes an Enlightenment project that gives the state an intimate role in policing, forming policy for, and shaping the communications media that link together the network of people and things, all in the name of securing the welfare of modern state and society. Drawing on Friedrich Schiller's plays, historical writings, and translations, as well as Sebastien Mercier's *Tableau de Paris* and Kant, Siegert develops a counter-image of the police as the medium through which the unity of a complex urbanizing society can be grasped as a transcendental unity. Siegert argues the salience of the police chief, who, as the new "father confessor," uses his many agents to mingle with the public, making police and public unthinkable apart from one another.

In the "Preacher's Footing," Michael Warner locates Enlightenment mediations in early American religious practice. Making use of Erving Goffman's concept of the "footing" of a speaker and a listener, Warner isolates the characteristics of the evangelical speech situation as it emerged in eighteenth-century Protestant revivals. Warner's essay offers an overview of the debates in the 1730s over the proper preacher's footing within the print media context within which evangelicalism thrived. A preacher's speech might be authorized, delivered with feeling, ironic, or quoting the words of another, while the listener might be figured as an eavesdropping bystander, a fellow Christian, and so on. In qualifying ~~countering the~~ revivalist practices of his own day, Jonathan Edwards sought to balance the traditional claims of a preacher's authority—as one who speaks in God's name—with the exhortation that can come from non preachers who are in an "extraordinary circumstances," like conversion or death, moments which the revivals had made an increasingly important aspect of the ~~is drawn into public sphere print and aural circulation, and there the~~ evangelical address to strangers. ~~became a powerful new norm. In Edwards's famous sermon, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," the emphasis on geography, compressed temporality, and numerical aggregation, whereby God is gathering his flock from many towns at an accelerating rate at *this* very moment, become distinctive traits of modern evangelicalism. Warner notes two ironies of this address's mediation of faith: first, with a rhetorical God addressing himself to believers, salvation seems to have become as quick and easy as giving assent to a voice or text; second, t~~In his reading of Edward's *Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion in*

New-England , Warner shows how difficult it has become to secure a distinction between traditional concepts of ministerial authority and what Warner calls, "the existential urgency of conversionistic preaching is itself sufficient warrant for public address regardless of status or context." Warner sees this early concern with the ~~his new~~ preacher's footing as the beginning of ~~creates~~ a "social imaginary of denominationalism," where secularism was remediated into one of many denominations, a form of, rather than outside of, religion.

In "Mediation as Primal Word: The Arts, the Sciences, and the Origins of the Aesthetic," Michael McKeon argues for the importance of "mediation" by highlighting its antithetical senses—"mediation" can connote both "connection/communication" as well as "intervene/separate." His historically grounded case history of mediation details the rather intricate process by which the concept of the aesthetic emerged from an explicit project: the effort (pursued in different ways by a very broad group of Enlightenment thinkers from John Locke to Joseph Addison to David Hume) to transport the epistemological posture developed by natural philosophy—one based in empirical observation, induction, and experiment—to the mediating work of the imagination in plays and novels. Thus McKeon confirms what Bender finds in his essay contribution to this volume: the centrality to eighteenth-century writing of experimental testing through experience. For McKeon what is crucial is the emergence of the aesthetic, a way of knowing that leans up against the prestige of empirical epistemology but produces a new kind of sensuous knowledge. McKeon finds that knowledge in a wide range of Enlightenment aesthetic and generic mediations: in the early debates about the two unities of time and place in the drama; in the way Daniel Defoe's most famous novel is organized around an experiment that tracks the progress of Robinson Crusoe from a "state of nature" to a civil society; in the way Samuel Richardson "tests" the young virgin Pamela through the death of her mistress and the temptation by Mr. B; in the way Samuel Johnson appeals in his criticism to an empirical "test of time" to uphold the objective aesthetic value of Shakespeare's plays. To recover the aesthetic from these instances as both a somatic and sensuous mode of knowing, McKeon recalls the double valence of mediation. While in the modern era we remember, and live with the effects of, the *separation* of the aesthetic from the scientific, we forget in doing so that this

differentiation is grounded in an original *connection and linkage* between the knowledge projects of natural philosophy and the knowledge projects of the arts. Both, he argues, were grounded in the experiential and experimental bias of Enlightenment mediations of knowledge.

<B>THE LOGICAL AND TEMPORAL PRIORITY OF MEDIATION</B>

 At the 2007 New York University conference "Mediating Enlightenment" from which this volume evolved, Geof Bowker led a plenary discussion. His disciplinary appointment, in communications and the history and philosophy of science, gave him a unique perspective on the importance of positing a "history of mediation." Both then and after the conference, Bowker made a strong case for the generative power of mediations or, to use his own words, "the ontological priority of mediation." Bowker argued that, since mediations subtend and generate the dualities through which we think (e.g., human/nature, self/other), it is an error to understand mediations as emerging from the dualities. For example, in Anglo-Saxon England, it is the mediation of the new written contract that produces the fraught duality, the before and after, of "orality" and "writing" (M. T. Clanchy). Or, to take another example, it is the mediation of the European empires that produces the modern duality of the human (who are capable of discovering the limits of the world) and nature (which must be now cataloged, stored up, and known as other than human).

Our primary purpose in this volume is to intervene productively in the ongoing discussion of Enlightenment. In Bowker's terms, however, our local efforts can be understood as an experiment that may speak to a broader constituency: what happens to what we know when we act on the premise of the ontological priority of mediation? The work that follows may thus carry implications for other kinds and areas of inquiry, and thus contribute to a conversation that extends across the disciplines that Enlightenment itself first configured.

<!Comp: notes will be set as endnotes; see design specs!>

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[1] Bacon 2000, 7. We have used two different translations of Bacon (1994 and 2000) to help us best capture what we understand to be the meaning and force of his arguments.

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[2] For the most comprehensive treatment of this conversation in Germany, see Schmidt 1996, 1–11, 49–52. In a 2007 lecture available on his Web site, Schmidt argues that ignorance of that conversation has led to two basic ways of "Misunderstanding the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'" The first reads Kant's essay as if it was a response to a request for a characterization of a period, and the second reads it as a "jumping off point for an evaluation of the degree to which the aspirations of his age might still have a claim on us" (4–5). Our introduction maps out an alternative that identifies Kant's claim as philosophical, not historical, and that turns back to Bacon rather than forward into claims about modernity.

[3] We quote from Lewis White Beck's translation of "Was ist Aufklärung," originally published in *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* but now conveniently reprinted together with Foucault's lectures on Kant and Enlightenment in Foucault, *The Politics of Truth,* 2007. Hereafter cited as Kant 2007, emphasis in the original.

[4] Asking how we "know knowledge" thus became for Foucault the "bold move that one must make" (2007, 80) to join his own late twentieth-century project to recast history as "genealogy." That effort became known, of course, for the next move: Foucault's strategy of moving boldly against the "human" as the subject and object of traditional histories. Deporting the question of the "self" itself into critique, he described Kant's Enlightenment both "negatively" and "positively." What it is not is "humanism." Since "the humanistic thematic is in itself too supple, too diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis for reflection," we must not confuse, he argued, "the theme of humanism with the question of the Enlightenment." What that question became, in Kant's hands, was just such an axis, an axis for "reflecting upon limits" through a "critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing" (111–113). Crucially for Foucault, however, this "critical ontology of ourselves" is not finally about ourselves (118). For us, as opposed to Kant, it has congealed into a "philosophical attitude" that "has to be translated into the labor of diverse inquiries"—inquiries that have "their methodological coherence in the at once archaeological and genealogical study of practices" (118, emphasis added). Although the specific kinds of inquiries Foucault called for were new, the project itself—advocating new forms of knowledge derived from a new methodology—was not. It is an obvious

echo of Bacon's induction-based "renewal," one that is amplified even further by chronological coincidence. Bacon, the Great Verulam, began his hybrid career in knowledge and politics exactly four hundred years before Foucault's ended, having been elected to Parliament in 1584, two years after completing his law degree

[5] For the changing historical meanings of "mediation" and related terms, see the essays by Eliassen and Jacobsen and Guillory in this volume.

[6] Guillory sees Bacon as "hesitat[ing] on the threshold" between "our concept of medium" in regard to "communication" and an "earlier semantic complex" of "means" and "imitation."

[7] See Foucault's disdainful dismissal of taking Enlightenment to be "a mere episode in the history of ideas" (Foucault 2007, 93).

[8] For an earlier attempt by Siskin and Warner to situate the study of Enlightenment in relation to what has been called the digital mutation, please see the site for the "Digital Retroaction" conference given at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in October, 2004. http://dc-mrg.english.ucsb.edu/conference/D_Retro/conference.html.

[9] We are here referring, of course, to what Julie Hayes calls the "historically locatable" Enlightenment rather than the transhistorical Homer-to-Hitler varieties (Hayes 1998).

[10] Deborah Harkness highlights the importance of "print culture" to Bacon and to his legacy, but casts it negatively as a product of his avoiding the "labor-intensive" work of science and a desire to value the work of gentlemen over "humble practitioners." Harkness 2007, 250–253.

[11] There is no absolute logic of mediation at work here. Unlike the natural and conjectural histories of the eighteenth century or more current but still Whig histories of science and technology, the history of mediation is not bound to a teleology of progress or to any other tale that it *must* tell. Instead, it facilitates the kinds of pattern recognition we need to make sense of things without imposing patterns on everything or reducing everything to the same pattern.

[12] Print can be best described as becoming dominant within a changing hierarchy of mediating technologies—in the same way that literary genres do at particular historical moments. Its position is not only a matter of more but of how its features function within

the other kinds. The power of satire in early eighteenth-century Britain, for example, is indexed both by the number of satires published and by the incorporation of satiric features in other forms—thus Alexander Pope's "Epistle to Arbuthnot" taking shape as a satiric letter. For a discussion of this aspect of genre theory, see Siskin 1988, 9–14.

[13] Our point is that mediation as we use it here can happen in many ways: yes, through the various forms of media, but also through tool use, associational practices, genre formation, the development of concepts, the use of protocols, etc. Although a history of mediation can give us access to the way change happens, it is not a normative ideal. The history of mediation does not necessarily describe progress toward a greater or better world. It is the unruly plurality of mediation(s) that makes our use of the term very different than that found in the philosophy of Hegel. There, mediation (*Vermittlung*) is embedded in the process of the dialectic, by which two terms enter into a dynamic exchange and produce a new and more comprehensive term. So, for example, when Hegel turns to the Enlightenment in the final chapter of *The Philosophy of History*, the new science is said to produce a reconciliation of nature, now grasped through its rational laws, and human consciousness, so that, through a "Reason" that comprehends both man and nature, "man finds himself at home in [nature], and that only passes for truth in which he finds himself at home… The recognition of the validity of these laws was designated by the term Elarcissement (*Aufklärung*)." In this volume, Michael McKeon's essay bears the closest connection to a Hegelian usage of dialectic as mediation—but without the imperative of progress. At the end of this introduction, we gesture vicariously through Geof Bowker toward the more philosophical implications of mediation—not as dialectic but as an "ontological priority" (Hegel 1956, 440, 441).

[14] We hope it is clear, in this introduction and throughout the volume, that "ideas" have not been left by the wayside. Instead, we are pointing here to the problem of constructing a history of ideas unmediated by genre, technology, etc.

[15] Enlightenment was also successful in the basic way that "events" can be said to be successful. As "one possible outcome of doing something"—in this case, as an outcome of mediation—the event of Enlightenment became a condition of possibility for

subsequent events. This "outcome" definition of "event" is important to the study of probability. See Siegel and Shim 2005.

[16] Berhard Siegert offers this formulation of the principle that subtends the postal system in Siegert 1999, 9.

[17] We have used the conventional translation of this phrase, though, the French word "gens" is gender neutral.

[18] According to John Nichols's monumental *Literary Anecdotes*, Shaw was "among the most eminent and extensively useful of those writers to whom the English Reader is indebted" (Nichols 1815, 764). He was joint editor with Chambers of the editions of Boerhaave's *Chemistry*. See Nichols 1815.

[19] The change we are identifying conforms to what we now call "emergence." For connections between emergence and the proliferation of print, see Siskin 2005, 819–823.

[20] E-mail correspondence between the authors, John Bender, and Dan Edelstein, 30 April, 2007. The quotation from Fontenelle is ""?Il s'-est répandu depuis un temps un esprit philosophique presque tout nouveau, une lumière qui n'avoit guères éclairé nos Ancêtres?"]For some time, an almost entirely new philosophical mindset has spread, a light which had hardly illuminated our Ancestors)]. The quotation from Dubos is "les lumieres que l'-esprit philosophique a répanduës sur notre siecle" [The illumination which the philosophical mind has spread over our century].

[21] Useful recent overviews of studies of Enlightenment may be found in *The Enlightenment* (Outram 1995/2005) and *The Case for Enlightenment* (Robertson 2005), as well as the three collections discussed in this introduction (Clark, Golinski, Shaffer, 1999; Knott and Taylor 2005; Carey and Festa 2009). In the overviews of Enlightenment studies offered in these five books, there are discussions of (by our count) thirty-four different books published since 1995 which contribute to a redefinition of Enlightenment. These synthetic overviews document the shift from pioneering intellectual history (the thought of the *philosophe*) to an emphasis on social practices (like reading), to an emphasis on national strains of Enlightenment (like the Scottish Enlightenment), as well as a tendency toward pluralizing Enlightenment until it loses any coherence. In *The Case for Enlightenment*, Robertson notes that the low repute that had befallen the

Enlightenment by the 1980s and 1990s may have incited a very diverse set of scholars to challenge arguments that make Enlightenment the convenient "straight man" of every progressive critique, whether it was staged from the right (in the wake of Edmund Burke) or left (in the wake of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno). Most recent scholars of the eighteenth century refuse the "blackmail" of Enlightenment that Foucault attributed to this position (see above).

[22] The work of Charles W. J. Withers in *Placing the Enlightenment* (2007) points to geography as another direction to take in mapping the mutations and proliferations of mediation as conditions of possibility for Enlightenment. In that book, "the idea of geography as an active agency—as practices carried out by people in and over spaces," becomes part of the practice of Enlightenment: a way "contemporaries came to terms with the extent and content of the terraqueous globe—the earth—as home" (15). This approach entails understanding geography as capacious—the mapping of the places and spaces of Enlightenment as an occurrence, as a way of conducting practical exploration of the earth, and as an emerging discipline of knowledge.